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Borer: Stokes v. Tutvet

RECENT MONTANA DECISIONS
OIL AND GAS-MINERAL DEEDS--ROYALTY ASSIGNMENTS-PAROL EviDENCE-Plaintiff-buyer and defendant-sellers entered into a land contract
whereby the sellers were to convey the land by "good and sufficient warranty deed'' "excepting and reserving unto the said first parties [sellers]
all except two percent (2%) of the landowner's royalty rights in and to
all oil, gas and other minerals in, under or upon said premises, said two
per cent (2%) of said landowner's royalty right to be deeded to the said
second party." At the time the contract was entered into the land was not
under oil and gas lease, but the sellers subsequently leased the land reserving a 121/2 per cent royalty. Buyer made all his payments and tendered a
deed to the seller for execution which reserved a 1012 per cent royalty.
The seller refused to execute this deed and tendered to the buyer a deed
reserving "all of the oil and gas and other minerals, in, under and that
may be produced from said land," along with a separate two per cent
royalty assignment. The buyer refused to accept these instruments and
brought suit for specific performance. The seller cross-complained alleging that the contract was ambiguous and praying for a declaratory judgment that the instruments which he had executed and tendered to the buyer
were in compliance with the contract. The trial court held that the contract was not ambiguous, excluded parol evidence of intent, and held for
the buyer. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, held, reversed
and remanded for new trial. The reservation is ambiguous and thus the
trial court erred in refusing to admit parol evidence. Stokes v. Tutvet,
328 P.2d 1096 (Mont. 1958).
Before discussing the instant case a brief resume of some basic Montana oil and gas law and a cursory distinction between the concepts "mineral" interest and "royalty" interest is in order. Montana is an ownership-in-place state.' That is, oil and gas, despite their fugacious nature,
are a: part of the real estate so long as they remain in it. A conveyance of
the land carries with it the minerals unless they are expressly excepted.'
The mineral estate, which includes oil and gas, may be severed from the
surface estate so that one or more persons may own the mineral estate in
fee simple and one or more different persons may own the surface estate.!
The owners of the mineral estate are not tenants in common with the owners of the surface estate, although fractional owners of the mineral estate
are tenants in common with one another.'
As the court in the instant case indicated, the owners of the mineral
estate have the following rights: (1) the right to enter upon the land to
explore for and produce oil and gas subject, of course, to an existing lease;
(2) the right to lease the property for oil and gas exploration and production; (3) the right to share in the bonus under future leases; (4) the right
to share in delay rentals under existing and future leases; and (5) the right
to share in the production under existing and future leases. This latter
right is known as the royalty right or the landowner's royalty right.

Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372, 207 Pac. 993, 24 A.L.R. 294 (1922).
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 67-1608.
'Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340, 162 A.L.R. 406 (1945).

2'Gas

'Henderson v. Chesley, 229 S.W. 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ; SULLIVAN,
OF OIL AND GAS LAW 48 n.48 (1955).
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Standing alone, "royalty" means a share of the produce or profit paid
It is analogous to the agricultural
to the owner of the mineral interest
lease wherein the owner of the land is paid a share of the crop. Ordinarily,
royalty is payable in terms of a set share of the gross production from the
land without any deduction for the costs of production.'
A royalty interest may be transferred by the mineral owner either before or after the land is leased, or after oil and gas are being produced.'
The assignee of a royalty interest has no rights in the land other than the
right to a share of the production, if and when production is obtained.'
The mineral owner, following a royalty assignment, retains all of the rights
enumerated above except the right to that share -of the royalty which he
has transferred to the royalty owner.' Thus, while a mineral owner can
obtain income (bonuses and delay rentals) in the absence of production,
the royalty owner will get nothing unless and until there is production.
Ordinarily, a fractional mineral owner is entitled to only his proportionate share of the royalty. 0 Assuming the usual lease (1/8th or 121/2 per
cent of production to the lessors and Vths or 871/2 per cent to the lessee)
the owner of one-half of the minerals would be entitled to one-half of the
royalty; i.e., one-half of l/th, or, 1/16th of gross production. Stated in
the terms of the principal case, if the sellers reserved a mineral interest
they reserved 98 per cent of the minerals and would be entitled to 98 per
cent of the bonus and delay rentals. They would also have a right to 98
per cent of the royalty; i.e., 98 per cent of 121/2 per cent, or, 121/4 per cent
of gross production. In that event, the purchaser would get only two per
cent of the bonus and delay rentals; and his royalty interest would likewise
be only two per cent of 121/2 per cent, or, 1/4 of one per cent of the gross
production.
On the other hand, if the sellers reserved a royalty interest, they would
get none of the bonus or delay rentals and only 101/2 per cent of the gross
production. The purchaser would receive all of the bonus and delay rentals
and two per cent of the gross production. With such markedly different
financial results flowing from the determination of whether a royalty interest or a mineral interest was reserved, the reason of the litigation over
the instant contract becomes obvious.
As stated above, "royalty" means a share in production. Hence, words
which contemplate or refer to production, such as "produced" or "produced and saved," are generally associated with a royalty interest.' A
mineral interest, on the other hand, contemplates a grant or reservation of
the minerals in place, and thus language which refers to the minerals in
the ground, such as "in, under or upon" the land is generally associated
with a mineral interest.' The problem of what interest was reserved or
'Hinerman v. Baldwin, 67 Mont. 417, 215 Pac. 1103 (1923).
'Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254, 38 P.2d 599 (1934).
'Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340, 162 A.L.R. 406 (1945).
"Ibid.
'Ibid.

'Swearingen v. Oldham, 195 Okla. 532, 159 P.2d 247 (1945).

"Rist v. Toole County, supra note 7; Mitchell v. Hannah, 123 Mont. 152, 208 P.2d
812 (1949) ; Miller v. Speed, 259 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) ; Armstrong v.
McCracken, 204 Okla. 319, 229 P.2d 590 (1951).
"Rist v. Toole County, supra note 7; Mitchell v. Hannah, supra note 11; Miller v.
Speed, supra note 11; Armstrong v. McCracken, supra note 11; Swearingen v. Oldham, supra note 10; Miller v. Speed, supra note 11.
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conveyed arises when royalty, or other words which ordinarily indicate only
an interest in production, are used with words which usually indicate a
mineral interest. The reservation in the case at bar is a prime example of
such a conflict. In such a case, in the absence of other language in the instrument establishing the intent of the parties, the court must either give
controlling effect to only part of the language used, or admit parol evidence
to determine what the parties intended to be the meaning of the instrument.
In the case at bar the court has done both.
Briefly stated, the rationale of the decision of the instant case is this:
(1) While the Montana Supreme Court has often stated that "royalty,"
used alone, means a share of the production paid to the owner of the land,
in practice, when "royalty" has been used in conjunction with other words
the court has given it a meaning consistent with the meaning of the other
words. (2) Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co." held that "royalty," used in conjunction with the words "found in or located upon or
under said land .. .or that may be produced therefrom," denoted a "mineral" interest. Due to the large number of land contracts presumably
drafted in reliance on the Marias River case during the twenty-four years
since it was decided, the court felt obliged to follow it. Thus, ordinarily
the reservation in question would have been held to be a mineral interest.
(3) However, the sellers' contention that the purchaser was to receive two
per cent of the gross production (as shown by their tender of a two per
cent royalty assignment) was inconsistent with their simultaneous contention that the reservation was of the entire mineral interest. The sellers
relied on the term "landowner's royalty" in one part of the contract to
establish a reservation of the mineral estate, and at the same time, relied
on the same term to show that the buyer was to get only an interest in production-a "royalty."
If the term indicated a mineral interest in the
first instance, the purchaser should have gotten a two per cent mineral interest. Yet if the purchaser got two per cent of the minerals, he would be
entitled to but two per cent of the royalty paid the lessor by the lessee;
i.e., two per cent of 121/2 per cent, or 1/4 of one per cent of gross production. Thus the reservation was ambigous, and the trial court erred in not
admitting parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties.
The court was clearly correct, for several reasons, in holding that the
reservation in question is ambiguous. First, assuming that a royalty was
intended, how much is a landowner's royalty? While it may be conceded
that the ordinary lease in Montana calls for a 121/2 per cent royalty, it would
not be unusual for a mineral owner whose land were surrounded by producing lands to obtain a considerably larger royalty, nor would there be anything wrong with a lease calling for a lesser royalty. The court took
judicial notice of the fact that the royalty is fixed by the relative bargaining position of the lessor."
The fact that the term "landowner's royalty" does not refer to any
fixed amount of production points up a further ambiguity in the reservation. The reservation provided that the sellers should retain "all except
two per cent (2%) of the landowner's royalty rights ... said two per cent
(2%) of said landowner's royalty rights to be deeded to the said second
1959]

_"98
Mont. 254, 38 P.2d 599 (1934).
'4Instant case at 1104.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1959

3

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
21 [1959],
Iss. 1, Art. 11

[Vol. 21,

party." If the reservation were a royalty interest the purchaser would
have all the mineral rights, and thus the leasing rights; what then would
prevent the purchaser from leasing the land retaining only a two per cent
royalty? In that event it would seem that the seller would obtain nothing.
On the other hand, since the purcahser would obtain no benefit from entering into a lease calling for more than a two per cent royalty, there would
be no incentive to him to try to lease the land at any higher royalty. The
untenable position in which the sellers-the owners of al but two per cent
of the royalty rights-would be makes it extremely unlikely that the sellers
ever intended to enter into such a contract.
A further ambiguity in the instrument is illustrated by the lauguage,
"two per cent (2%) of the landowner's royalty rights." Construed literally, this means two per cent times the landowner's royalty.' If we assume
the ordinary lease with a 121/2 per cent landowner's royalty, the purchaser
would receive .02 times .125, or, 1/4 of one per cent. While it might be reasonable for a person to purchase 1/4 of one per cent of the oil and gas produced from land having producing wells,' it seems very unlikely that anyone would purchase such a small royalty in land without proven petroleum
deposits. This latter argument applies with equal force to the sellers'
contention that the reservation is a mineral interest, since, if the purchaser
bought only two per cent of the mineral rights, he would be entitled to but
two per cent of a 121/2 per cent royalty, or, 1/4 of one per cent of production.
It is recognized that the above arguments go to the wisdom of the contract rather than to its ambiguity in a legal sense. Nonetheless, when the
literally interpreted terms of a contract result in legal relationships which
the parties are very unlikely to have desired, there is some ground for finding the contract ambiguous.
The most substantial ambiguity, the one with which the court was
primarily concerned, is the use of the term "landowner's royalty rights"
in conjunction with the words "in, under or upon" the land, and the total
absence of any additional language to indicate the intent of the parties.
As previously indicated, the words "in, under or upon" are normally associated with a mineral interest, while "landowner's royalty" refers to a
share of the oil and gas actually produced from the land. In deciding that
the words "in, under or upon" the land should control, and thus that the
reservation would ordinarily be held to be a mineral interest, the court relied heavily on the 1934 Montana case of Marias River Syndicate v. Big
West Oil Co.

In the Marias River case the court was confronted with a deed which
reserved a "12
per cent interest and royalty in and to all oil and gas
...found in or located upon or under said land ... or that may be produced therefrom." As interpreted by the court in subsequent cases,' the
reservation was held to be a mineral interest by virtue of the use of the
words "found in or located upon or under" said land. Inasmuch as in that
Op. Cit. 8upra note 4, at 223.
"E.g., Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340, 162 A.L.R. 406 (1945), concerns royalty owners having as little as 1/10th of 1% royalty. However, the land
involved was in the Kevin-Sunburst field.
7
1 Supra note 13.
"Rist v. Toole County, supra note 16; Mitchell v. Hannah, 123 Mont. 152, 208 P.2d
812 (1949).
"SULLIVAN,
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case the words "found in or located upon or under" prevailed over both
"royalty" and "that may be produced therefrom," it would seem to follow
logically that "in, under or upon" should prevail over" landowner's royalty
rights" in this case. This was apparently the reasoning of the court. Yet
who can deny that an instrument containing but two phrases, each indicating a different and conflicting interest, is ambiguous. Clearly the court
was correct in remanding the case for a new trial with instructions to admit parol evidence as to the intent of the parties.
In addition to the reservation being ambiguous, the decision itself is
somewhat ambiguous in that it does not decide with any marked degree of
finality whether or not the word "royalty" will be given its ordinary
meaning when used in the future. At the outset of the opinion the court
said: "The wording is susceptible of several interpretations and we think
reasonably so. The trial court was thrown into error by his belief that
the terms of the contract were not at all ambiguous."' Toward the end of
the opinion the court stated :'
This court . . .has repeatedly and consistently given strict inter-

pretation to the qualifying words with which the word "royalty"
appears. Although Montana has consistently stated rather pontifically, that the word "royalty" has a strict meaning, nevertheless
we have just as consistently ignored the word when it is used in
conjunction with others, and looked to its associates to construe its
meaning. So long as Montana adheres to this principle we do not
feel impelled to give the word "royalty" any more strict construction than it has been given in the past. The mere fact "landowner's royalty" appears in this instrument would normally be given
no more emphasis than it has in the past, for we would be impelled,
by stare decisis to follow the Marias River case. [Emphasis
added.]
This language is susceptible of two constructions: (1) that the words "in,
under or upon" have been indicative of a mineral interest for so longtwenty-four years since Marias River was decided-that their use, as a rule
of property, creates a mineral interest, and if any change is to be made the
legislature must make it; or (2) that the reservation is clearly ambiguous
and thus the court did not have to make a final decision as to whether
"landowner's royalty" or "in, under or upon" the land is the controlling
language in this instance.
It is also possible that the above-quoted language divested the word
"royalty" of any intrinsic meaning when used in a Montana oil and gas
conveyance. If the court, in construing the word "royalty" must always
look to the language with which it is associated, it would seem that a conveyance of a "royalty" might be totally ineffective unless it also contained the phrase "produced and saved." Such an interpretation of the
instant case would be undesirable, and would seem to be a broader rule
than is necessary for the decision. Hence, it seems more likely that the court
rather intended to say that it would construe the word "royalty" in the
light of the associated language only if that language were in conflict with
the ordinary meaning of "royalty."
"instant
case at 1099.
Old. at 1103.
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The problem of the weight and the efficacy to be given to the use of
the word "royalty" in oil and gas instruments is one which has long
plagued the courts in the principal oil and gas states. The decisions are
far from uniform and considerable vacilliation occurs even within the same
jurisdiction. Since 1923,21 the Supreme Court of Montana has consistently
stated in almost every oil and gas case to come before it that the word
"royalty" has a well defined meaning. "Royalty" is generally understood
in the oil and gas industry to mean a share of the production." Thus, both
the court and the oil industry concur as to the meaning of the term. Further, all concerned concur in the distinction between the rights of a~royalty
owner and the rights of a mineral owner.' Hence the desirability of the
court giving great, if not always controlling, weight to the use of the word
"royalty" in an oil and gas instrument seems obvious.
The court was well aware of the desirability of giving considerable
weight to the use of the word "royalty."
That is shown both by the fact
that the court wrote an earlier opinion on this same case in which it gave
controlling effect to the term "landowner's royalty," and by the following
quotation from the instant decision:'
Perhaps, when the Marias River case was decided, it might have
been a better result to have strictly construed the word "royalty,"
rather than giving more importance to the fact the words "in,
under and upon" were used....
The factor which apparently influenced the court not to give controlling effect to the use of the term "landowner's royalty," as did the trial
court, was the fear that many long-standing mineral and royalty titles
would be disturbed." As was pointed out above, in the Marias River case
the court held that a reservation of "12
per cent interest and royalty in
,and to all oil and gas ...

found in or located upon or under the land...

or that may be produced therefrom" reserved a mineral interest. While
in the opinion of this author the Marias River decision was not based on
the use of the words "found in or located upon or under the land," two
subsequent decisionse of the Montana court have distinguished the Marias
River instrument from the ones then before the court on the ground of
the use of those words in Marias River and their absence in the instruments
then in question. Accepting this interpretation of the Marias River decision as correct, and accepting the court's assumption that many mineral
and royalty titles are based on the Maiias River holding, the balance struck
by the court here between the conflicting interests seems to be the correct
one. Conceding the desirability of the court's giving considerable if not
"Hinerman v. Baldwin, 67 Mont. 417, 215 Pac. 1103 (1923).
2
Homestake Exploration Corp. v. Schoregge, 81 Mont. 604, 264 Pac. 388 (1927),
2
9Rlst v. Toole County, supra note 16; Mitchell v. Hannah, supra note 18; Voyta v.
Clonts, 328 P.2d 655 (Mont. 1958).
"15 State Rep. 52 (Mont. Jan. 16, 1958).
'Instant case at 1103.
'0"We may rightfully assume that many land contracts have been executed with the
thought in mind of conforming the provisions of a mineral grant to those in the
Marias case." Ibid.
2
Rist v. Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 159 P.2d 340, 162 A.L.R. 406 (1945) ; MItchell
v.Hannah, 123 Mont, 152, 208 F,24 812 (1949).
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always controlling weight to the use of the word "royalty," few persons
would argue that it should be done at the expense of long settled land titles.
An unfortunate, though probably unavoidable, result of the instant
case is that it is now extremely unlikely that the Montana court will ever
give controlling effect to the word "royalty," if it is used in an oil and gas
conveyance which contains any conflicting language looking toward a mineral interest.
In any event it is clear both from the principal case and from prior
decisions, that an instrument intended to convey a share in production
should state that the interest transferred is a "royalty in and to all oil and
gas produced and saved" from the land.' If on the other hand, the parties
intend the instrument to convey all or part of the minerals in place, the
instrument should convey the "minerals in, under and upon the land.' '=
EDWARD W. BORER

PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-MIALPRACTICE-EXTRAJUDICIAL

ADMISSIONS

O' TaE DEFENDANT-Plaintiff had his gall bladder removed and a T-tube
inserted, extending from the common duct to the outside of the abdomen.
After plaintiff returned home from the hospital, he went to defendant
physician's office to have the T-tube irrigated with a solution of alcohol
and ether. Immediately following the irrigation, plaintiff became desperately ill and had to return to the hospital for an extended time. In an action
against the defendant for malpractice, the plaintiff alleged that the physician was negligent in the irrigation of the T-tube and that, as a result of
such negligence, plaintiff's liver was irrigated and severe injury caused.
The defendant died pending the action and his estate was substituted as
party defendant. An expert medical witness stated at the trial that it was
not an accepted medical practice to irrigate the liver with an alcohol-ether
solution. He also stated that in his opinion the liver of the plaintiff had
not been irrigated. Plaintiff's daughter testified that the defendant admitted to her that he had irrigated the liver through the T-tube with pressure, and that the irrigation had caused the subsequent pain and irritation.
The district court granted a nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff failed
to show by expert testimony that the irrigation of the T-tube had been performed negligently and that the liver had been irrigated. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Montana, held, reversed. The admission of the defendant
was sufficient to show negligence. Thomas v. Merriam., 337 P.2d 604,
(Mont. 1959) (Justice Castles and Dist. Judge Shea, dissenting).
The Montana Supreme Court"has defined malpractice as "bad or unskillful practice . . . and comprises all acts and omissions of a physician or
surgeon as such to a patient as such, which may make the physician or
surgeon either civilly or criminally liable.'
In proof of malpractice there are usually three separate considerations
-establishment of the applicable standard of care, proof of the defendant's
"Ibid. See also 3A SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 241 (perm. ed. 1958).
2SuMMms, op. cit. supra note 28, at 242.
'Bakewell v. Kahle, 125 Mont. 89, 93, 232 P.2d 127, 129 (1951).
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